000 | 02049nam a22003258i 4500 | ||
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_c13956 _d13948 |
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001 | NDU01-004616592 | ||
003 | InNd | ||
005 | 20230430143949.0 | ||
006 | m o d | ||
007 | cr n --- a | ||
008 | 160928s2017 enk o 1 0 eng d | ||
020 |
_a9781108161046 _q(ebook) |
||
020 | _z9781107194595 (hardback) | ||
020 | _z9781316646427 (paperback) | ||
035 | _a(UkCbUP)CR9781108161046 | ||
040 |
_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP |
||
050 | _aD763.N6 K48 2017 | ||
100 | 1 |
_aKiszely, John, _eauthor. |
|
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aAnatomy of a Campaign : _bThe British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 / _cJohn Kiszely. |
300 | _a1 online resource. | ||
490 | 0 | _aCambridge Military Histories | |
500 | _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Jul 2017). | ||
520 | _aThe British campaign in Norway in 1940 was an ignominious and abject failure. It is perhaps best known as the fiasco which directly led to the fall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his replacement by Winston Churchill. But what were the reasons for failure? Why did the decision makers, including Churchill, make such poor decisions and exercise such bad judgement? What other factors played a part? John Kiszely draws on his own experience of working at all levels in the military to assess the campaign as a whole, its context and evolution from strategic failures, intelligence blunders and German air superiority to the performance of the troops and the serious errors of judgement by those responsible for the higher direction of the war. The result helps us to understand not only the outcome of the Norwegian campaign but also why more recent military campaigns have found success so elusive. | ||
710 | 2 |
_aCambridge University Press. _4pltfrm |
|
730 | 0 | _aCambridge University Press books online. | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrint version: _z9781107194595 |
830 | 0 | _aCambridge military histories. | |
856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttp://proxy.library.nd.edu/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108161046 _yNotre Dame Online Access |
942 |
_2lcc _cBKC _07 |